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Abstract— We present a new approach to automated
scenario-based testing of the safety of autonomous vehicles,
especially those using advanced artificial intelligence-based
components, spanning both simulation-based evaluation as
well as testing in the real world. Our approach is based on
formal methods, combining formal specification of scenarios
and safety properties, algorithmic test case generation using
formal simulation, test case selection for track testing, executing
test cases on the track, and analyzing the resulting data.
Experiments with a real autonomous vehicle at an industrial
testing facility support our hypotheses that (i) formal simulation
can be effective at identifying test cases to run on the track,
and (ii) the gap between simulated and real worlds can be
systematically evaluated and bridged.
I. INTRODUCTION
A defining characteristic of the growth in autonomous
vehicles (AVs) and automated driving systems (ADS) is
the expanding use of machine learning (ML) and other
artificial intelligence (AI) based components in them. ML
components, such as deep neural networks (DNNs), have
proved to be fairly effective at perceptual tasks, such as
object detection, classification, and image segmentation, as
well as for prediction of agent behaviors. However, it is
known that ML components can be easily fooled by so-
called adversarial examples, and there have also been well-
documented failures of AVs in the real world for which the
evidence points to a failure (in part) of ML-based perception.
Therefore, there is a pressing need for better techniques for
testing and verification of ML/AI-based ADS and AVs [1].
Simulation is regarded as an important tool in the design
and testing of AVs with ML components. Advanced pho-
torealistic simulators are now available for AVs, providing
designers with the ability to simulate “billions of miles” so
as to test their AV components, cover corner-case scenarios
that are hard to test in the real world, and diagnose issues that
arise in real-world testing, such as disengagements. However,
some key questions remain. How well does simulation match
the real world? What is the value of simulation vis-a-vis
testing in a physical environment that includes other vehicles,
pedestrians, and other road users?
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Fig. 1. The Autonomous Vehicle (AV) and pedestrian dummy used for
track testing. The picture shows the AV hitting the pedestrian during testing
(test F1 Run 1, https://youtu.be/PehgLCGHF5U), see Section V for details.
An intermediate step between simulation and testing on
public roads is track testing. This form of testing involves
driving the AV on roads in a test facility with a reasonable
degree of control over the other agents around the AV,
including, for example, pedestrian dummies and inflatable
cars to use for crash testing. Track testing allows one to run
the actual AV with its real hardware and software systems
in environments that can be designed to mimic certain
challenging driving conditions. However, track testing can
be very expensive, labor-intensive, and time-consuming to set
up. Given these challenges, which tests should one run? For
testing AVs with complex ML-based components, it is crucial
to be able to run the tests that will prove most effective at
identifying failures or strange behavior, uncovering bugs, and
increasing assurance in the safety of the AV and ADS.
This paper takes a step towards addressing these problems
by investigating the following two questions:
1. Can formal simulation aid in designing effective road tests
for AVs? By formal simulation we mean simulation-based
testing that is guided by the use of formal models of
test scenarios and formal specification of safety properties
and metrics. More specifically, do unsafe (safe) runs in
simulation produce unsafe (safe) runs on the track? How
should one select tests from simulation to run on the track?
2. How well can simulation match track testing of AVs? We
aim to quantitatively and qualitatively compare simulation
and track testing data, for a test scenario that has been
formally specified and implemented in both simulation
and track testing.
Our approach is rooted in formal methods, a field cen-
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tered on the use of mathematical models of systems and
their requirements backed by computational techniques for
their design and verification. In particular, we use a formal
probabilistic programming language, SCENIC [2], to specify
a test scenario, encapsulating key behaviors and parameters
of the AV and its environment. Additionally, we use formal
specification languages, such as Metric Temporal Logic [3],
to specify safety properties for AVs. We combine formally-
specified scenario descriptions and requirements with algo-
rithms for simulation-based verification of AVs, also known
as falsification, implemented in an open-source toolkit called
VERIFAI [4]. These methods, when combined with an
advanced photorealistic full-stack simulator for AVs, the
LGSVL Simulator [5], allow us to identify safe and unsafe
behaviors of the AV in simulation. We seek to answer the
above questions by incorporating into the simulator a “digital
twin” of an industrial-scale test track, the GoMentum Station
test facility in Concord, California [6]. We have developed
and deployed a simulation-to-test-track flow where formal
simulation is used to identify test cases to execute on the
track, and these test cases are systematically mapped onto
hardware that is used to control agents on the track in
the AV’s environment. We present the results of executing
this flow on a scenario involving a pedestrian crossing in
front of an AV, providing evidence for the effectiveness
of formal simulation for identifying track tests, as well as
a quantitative mechanism for comparing simulation results
with those obtained on the track. Specifically, our results
indicate that:
1. Our formal simulation-based approach is effective at syn-
thesizing test cases that transfer well to the track: 62.5% of
unsafe simulated test cases resulted in unsafe behavior on
the track, including a collision; 93.3% of safe simulated
test cases resulted in safe behavior on the track (and no
collisions). Our results also shed light on potential causes
for AV failure in perception, prediction, and planning.
2. While AV and pedestrian trajectories obtained in simula-
tion and real-world testing for the same test were qualita-
tively similar (e.g., see Fig 6), we also noted differences
as quantified using time-series metrics [7], [8] and with
metrics such as minimum distance between the AV and
pedestrian. Variations exist even amongst simulations of
the same test case due to non-deterministic behavior of
the AV stack, although these are smaller.
Related Work
Scenario-based testing of AVs is a well-studied area. One
approach is to construct tests from scenarios created from
crash data analysis ([9], [10]) and naturalistic driving data
(NDD) analysis ([11], [12]), which leverage human driving
data to generate test scenarios. Similarly, the PEGASUS
project [13] focuses on (i) bench-marking human driving
performance using a comprehensive dataset comprising crash
reports, NDD, etc., and (ii) characterizing the requirements
that AVs should satisfy to ensure the traffic quality is at least
unaffected by their presence. Our work differs from these in
the use of formal methods for specifying scenarios and safety
properties, as well as in automated synthesis of test cases.
Our use of a scenario specification language, SCENIC [2],
is related to other work on scenario description languages.
OpenSCENARIO [14] defines a file format for the descrip-
tion of the dynamic content of driving and traffic simulators,
based on the extensible markup language (XML). GeoSce-
nario [15] is a somewhat higher-level domain specific lan-
guage (DSL) for scenario representation, whose syntax also
looks like XML. SCENIC is a flexible high-level language
that is complementary to these. The Measurable Scenario
Description Language (M-SDL) [16] is a recent higher-level
DSL similar to SCENIC, which precedes its definition; while
M-SDL is more specialized for AV testing, it has less support
than SCENIC for probabilistic and geometric modeling and
is not supported by open-source back-end tools for verifica-
tion, debugging, and synthesis of autonomous AI/ML based
systems, unlike SCENIC which is complemented by the open-
source VERIFAI toolkit [4].
Recent work on the test scenario library generation
(TSLG) problem ([17], [18]) mathematically describes a
scenario, defines a relevant metric, and generates a test
scenario library. A critical step in TSLG is to construct
a surrogate model of an autonomous vehicle. The authors
construct this based on human driving data, which, while
useful, may not capture the subtleties in complex ML/AI-
based autonomous vehicle stacks. Additionally, the work
presents only simulation results, whereas our paper reports
on both simulation and track testing with a real AV. Abbas et
al. [19] present a test harness for testing an AV’s perception
and control stack in a simulated environment and searching
for unsafe scenarios. However, in the absence of a formal
scenario description language, representing an operational
design domain (ODD) becomes tedious manual labor and
challenging as the number of traffic participants scales up.
Researchers have considered the gap between simulation
and road/track testing. A methodology for testing AVs in
a closed track, as well as in simulation and mixed-reality
settings, is explored in [20]. The main aim there is to evaluate
the AV’s performance across the different settings using
standard tests [21], rather than use computational techniques
to generate tests based on formally-specified scenarios and
outcomes, as we aim to do. A recent SAE EDGE research
report [22] dives deeper into unsettled issues in determining
appropriate modeling fidelity for automated driving systems.
While it raises important questions, it does not address
formal methods for evaluation as we do.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, this paper
is the first to apply a formal methods-based approach to
evaluating the safety of ML-based autonomous vehicles
spanning formal specification of scenarios and safety prop-
erties, formal simulation-based test generation and selection
for track testing, as well as evaluation of the methodology in
both simulation and the real world, including systematically
measuring the gap between simulation and track testing.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SCENIC: A Scenario Specification Language
SCENIC [2] is a domain-specific probabilistic program-
ming language for modeling the environments of cyber-
physical systems. A SCENIC program defines a distribution
over scenes, configurations of objects and agents; a program
describing “bumper-to-bumper traffic” might specify a partic-
ular distribution for the distance between cars, while letting
the location of the scene be uniformly random over all 3-
lane roads in a city. SCENIC provides convenient syntax for
geometry, along with declarative constraints, which together
make it possible to define such complex scenarios in a
concise, readable way. SCENIC has a variety of applications
to the design of ML-based systems: for example, one can
write a SCENIC program describing a rare traffic scenario
like a disabled car blocking the road, then sample from it
to generate specialized training data to augment an existing
dataset [2]. More generally, the formal semantics of the
language allow it to be used as a precisely-defined model
of the environment of a system, as we will see in Sec. IV-B.
B. The VERIFAI Toolkit
The VERIFAI toolkit [4] provides a unified framework
for the design and analysis of AI- and ML-based cyber-
physical systems, based on a simple paradigm: simulations
driven by formal models and specifications. In VERIFAI,
we first parametrize the space of environments and sys-
tem configurations of interest, either by explicitly defining
parameter ranges or using the SCENIC language described
above. VERIFAI then generates concrete tests by searching
this space, using a variety of algorithms ranging from simple
random sampling to global optimization techniques. Each
test results in a simulation run, where the satisfaction or
violation of a system-level specification is checked; the
results of each test are used to guide further search, and
any violations are recorded in a table for further analysis.
This architecture enables a wide range of use cases, including
falsification, fuzz testing, debugging, data augmentation, and
parameter synthesis, demonstrated in [4], [23].
C. The LGSVL Simulator
The LGSVL Simulator [5] is an open-source autonomous
driving simulator used to facilitate the development and
testing of autonomous driving software systems. With sup-
port for the Robot Operating System (ROS, ROS2), and
alternatives such as CyberRT, the simulator can be used
with popular open source autonomous platforms like Apollo
(from Baidu) and Autoware (from the Autoware Foundation).
Thus, it allows one to simulate an entire autonomous vehicle
with a full sensor suite in a safe, deterministic (assuming
determinism in the AV software stack behavior), and realistic
3D environment. The LGSVL Simulator provides simul-
taneous real-time outputs from multiple sensors including
cameras, GPU-accelerated LiDAR, RADAR, GPS, and IMU.
Environmental parameters can be changed including map,
weather, time of day, traffic and pedestrians, and the entire
simulation can be controlled through a Python API. The
LGSVL Simulator is available free and open-source on
GitHub (https://github.com/lgsvl/simulator).
D. GoMentum Station Testing Facility
GoMentum Station (GoMentum) [6] is currently the
largest secure AV test site in the United States. Located in
Concord, CA, 35 miles from San Francisco and 60 miles
from Silicon Valley, GoMentum features 19 miles of road-
ways, 48 intersections, and 8 distinct testing zones over 2,100
acres, with a variety of natural and constructed features.
Vehicle manufacturers, AV system developers and other
entities have been testing connected and automated vehicles
at GoMentum since 2014. Our experiments were conducted
in the “urban” or “downtown” zone of GoMentum, which
features mostly flat surface streets that are approximately
20 feet wide and several signed, unsigned, and signalized
intersections amid an urban and suburban landscape with
buildings, trees, and other natural and human-made features.
Speeds are restricted to under 30 mph. The roads feature
clear and visible lane markings on freshly paved roads. The
traffic signs include one-way, stop, yield, and speed limits.
III. METHODOLOGY
We now describe the methodology we use to assess the
safety of the AV in simulation, identify test cases to run at
the testing facility (track), implement those tests on the real
AV and associated testing hardware, and perform post-testing
data analysis.
Let M be the simulation model, including the full soft-
ware stack and vehicle dynamics model of the AV, and
its environment, including models of all other objects and
agents in the simulated world. This model can be configured
through a vector of parameters ~pi, typically supplied through
a configuration file or suitable API to the simulator. Each
valuation of ~pi defines a test case x. We assume, for this
section, that each test case x produces a unique simulation
run.1 The time series data generated by the simulation run is
referred to as a trace τ . Each test case x is designed so as to
also be implementable on the real AV on the track, although
such implementation can be non-trivial as we describe later.
On the track, the environment is less controllable than in the
simulator, and therefore a single test case xi can produce
multiple test runs ri,1, ri,2, . . ..
A key aspect of our method is to formally specify a set of
test cases along with an associated probability distribution
over them. We refer to this distribution of test cases as a
scenario S, which is defined by a SCENIC program PS .
Typically, a subset of simulation parameters ~pi are modeled
in PS , while the others are left fixed for the experiment.
Our overall methodology is depicted in Fig. 2, and in-
volves the following steps:
1. Create Simulation Model (Sec. IV-A): The first step is to
create a photorealistic simulation environment including
dynamical models for a range of agents implementable on
the test track. This involves high-definition (HD) mapping,
collecting sensor data, using the collected data to create
a detailed 3D mesh, loading that mesh into the simulator,
annotating details of drivable areas in the simulator, and
combining the resulting 3D world model in the simulator
with vehicle and agent dynamics models.
2. Formalize Test Scenario (Sec. IV-B): The next step is to
formalize the test scenario(s) to execute on the track. We
take a formal methods approach, specifying test scenarios
in the SCENIC probabilistic programming language [2].
3. Formalize Safety Property/Metric (Sec. IV-B): Along with
formally specifying the scenario, we must also specify
1Note, however, that some industrial simulators and AV stacks tend to
be non-deterministic in that the configurable parameters may not define
a unique simulation run. We will discuss later the impact of such non-
determinism on our results.
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Fig. 2. Formal scenario-based testing methodology used in this paper.
one or more properties that capture the conditions under
which the AV is deemed to be operating safely. In formal
methods, safety properties over traces are usually specified
in a logical notation such as temporal logics. When these
properties are quantitative, we term them safety metrics.
4. Identify Safe/Unsafe Test Cases (Sec. IV-C): Once the
above three steps are complete, the simulation model, test
scenario, and safety properties are fed into the VERIFAI
tool to perform falsification. The SCENIC scenario PS
defines a distribution over the parameters ~pi. We config-
ured VERIFAI to sample from this distribution, simulating
each corresponding test case and monitoring the safety
properties on the resulting trace. VERIFAI stores the
sampled values of ~pi in safe or error tables depending
on whether the test satisfies or violates the specification.
Moreover, VERIFAI uses the robust semantics of metric
temporal logic (MTL) [24] to compute a quantitative
satisfaction value ρ for the specification ϕ which indicates
how strongly it is satisfied: ρ > 0 implies ϕ is satisfied,
and larger values of ρ mean that larger modifications to
the trace would be necessary for ϕ to instead be falsified.
The resulting test cases are fed to the next step.
5. Select Test Cases for Track Testing (Sec. IV-D): VERIFAI
provides several techniques, such as Principal Component
Analysis and clustering, to automatically analyze the safe
and error tables and extract patterns. For low-dimensional
spaces, direct visualization can also be used to identify
clusters of safe/unsafe tests. Using either approach, we
identify different behavior modes, and select representa-
tive test cases to execute on the track.
6. Implement Selected Test Cases on Track (Sec. V): Once
test cases have been identified in simulation, we need to
execute them on the track. For this, dynamic agents (en-
vironment vehicles, pedestrians, bicyclists, etc.) must be
controllable using parameters (e.g., starting location, time
to start motions, velocities, etc.) specified in the SCENIC
program and synthesized into a test case. Even state-of-
the-art hardware for track testing can have limitations that
must be matched to the tests synthesized in simulation so
as to accurately reproduce them on the track.
7. Record Results and Perform Data Analysis (Sec. VI):
Finally, during track testing, we record various data
including videos of the AV moving through the test
environment, data on the AV including all sensor data
and log data from the AV software stack, as well as
data from the test track hardware including GPS beacons
and the hardware used to control dynamic agents such
as a pedestrian dummy. We then analyze this data to
evaluate the effectiveness of test case selection through
formal simulation, the correspondence between simulation
traces and the traces from track experiments, and potential
reasons for unsafe or interesting behavior of the AV.
IV. SIMULATION
A. Simulation Model Creation
The photorealistic simulation environment is a “digital
twin” of the “Urban A” test area at GoMentum. The envi-
ronment was created by collecting hundreds of gigabytes of
LiDAR point cloud, camera image, and location data while
driving around the site. The collected point cloud data was
processed and converted into a unified 3D mesh representing
every bump and crack in the road surface as well as all of the
surrounding objects including curbs, sidewalks, buildings,
signs, etc. Tens of thousands of captured images were then
processed into textures and applied to the 3D mesh. The
mesh was loaded into the LGSVL Simulator, which was used
to annotate details of the drivable areas including lane lines,
driving directions, road speeds, crosswalks, intersections, and
traffic signs. The annotated, textured mesh was then compiled
into a loadable simulation environment along with HD maps
that were used both in simulation and in the AV for real-
world testing.2
B. Test Scenario and Safety Properties
We selected a scenario where the AV turns right at an
intersection, encountering a pedestrian who crosses the road
with hesitation, which the AV drives through. This scenario
is diagrammed in Fig. 3. To aid implementation on the track,
we fixed the initial positions and orientations of the AV
and pedestrian, and defined the pedestrian’s trajectory as a
straight line with 3 parameters3:
• the delay tstart after which the pedestrian starts crossing
(with a fixed speed of 1 m/s);
• the distance dwalk the pedestrian walks before hesitating;
• the amount of time thesitate the pedestrian hesitates.
We encoded this scenario as the SCENIC program shown
in Fig. 4. On lines 7–10 we specify the parameters above
to have uniform distributions over appropriate ranges (e.g.,
tstart ∈ (7, 15)). The functions DriveTo and Hesitate
2The GoMentum digital twin environment is available as a free download
including HD maps in the OpenDRIVE, Lanelet2, Apollo, and Autoware
formats at https://content.lgsvlsimulator.com/maps/gomentum/.
3Other parametrizations are possible. Our choice here corresponds most
directly to what we could implement on the test track: see Sec. V-A.
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Fig. 3. Bird’s-eye view of the scenario S.
Fig. 4. The (simplified) SCENIC program PS encoding our test scenario.
on lines 3 and 6 specify the dynamic behavior4 of the
AV and the pedestrian, using API calls to Apollo and the
LGSVL Simulator to command the AV to drive through the
intersection and the pedestrian to walk as described above.
Finally, we defined specifications for VERIFAI to monitor
during execution of our test cases. The most important safety
specification is the following: “the AV never comes close
to colliding with the pedestrian.” We can formalize this in
Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [3] as ϕsafe = G(dist >
2.5 m) where dist represents the distance between the AV
and the pedestrian (which we can record using the LGSVL
Simulator API), and G is the MTL operator “globally”,
which asserts that a condition holds at every time point. We
chose a threshold of 2.5 m because we measured dist as
the distance from the center of the AV to the center of the
pedestrian5: the distance from the center of the AV to its
front bumper is 2.1 m and to its side is 0.95 m.
C. Identifying Safe and Unsafe Test Cases
Having defined the SCENIC program PS above, we used
VERIFAI to perform falsification, sampling parameter values
from the distribution S, running the corresponding tests in
the LGSVL Simulator, and monitoring for violations of our
specification ϕsafe. We generated 1294 test cases, of which
2% violated ϕsafe. VERIFAI’s error table stored the parameter
values for all such cases, along with the quantitative satisfac-
tion value ρ of the specification; for ϕsafe, this is simply the
4The behavior property is used by a prototype extension of SCENIC
with dynamics, which is used to define DriveTo and Hesitate and will
be described in a future paper.
5In future work we plan to improve the simulator interface to measure
the distance from the surface of the AV to the surface of the pedestrian.
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Fig. 5. Satisfaction value ρ of ϕsafe (i.e. the minimum distance from the
AV to the pedestrian, minus 2.5 m) as a function of tstart and dwalk.
minimum distance between the AV and the pedestrian over
the course of the test, minus 2.5 m. We configured VERIFAI
to store the safe runs as well to distinguish robustly-safe
runs from near-accident runs. The ρ values help to identify
marginal regions that are good candidates for testing. Fig. 5
shows ρ as a function of the start delay tstart and the walk
distance dwalk. The darker the points, the smaller the values of
ρ, i.e. the closer they are to a collision. We can see that there
is no simple relation between parameter values and collisions
that could be determined with a few manually-selected tests:
systematic falsification was crucial for test generation.
D. Test Case Selection
In our experiments, the parameter vector ~pi was low-
dimensional enough for direct visualization (there being only
3 parameters). We observe in Fig. 5 that there is one main
cluster of unsafe runs, in the bottom-left, and other unsafe
runs towards the right for large values of tstart; however,
the latter were harder to implement due to limitations of
track equipment. Using Fig. 5 and similar plots for the
hesitate time thesitate, we selected values of ~pi corresponding
to three kinds of tests: failure/unsafe (F), marginally safe
(M), and robustly safe/success (S). The success cases were
selected from the upper-left quadrant of Fig. 5 and have a
neighborhood of safe tests. The failure and marginal cases
were selected from the bottom-left quadrant. The marginal
cases are those that satisfy ϕsafe, but lie close to other failure
cases; hence, implementing these cases in the real world may
result in failure due to imprecision in implementing ~pi on real
hardware. We thereby obtained 7 test cases to execute on the
track as shown in Table I.
V. TRACK TESTING
A. Experimental Setup
Test AV: The test vehicle is a 2018 Lincoln MKZ Hybrid
(shown in Fig. 1) enhanced with DataSpeed drive-by-wire
functionality and several sensors including a Velodyne VLS-
128 LiDAR, three Leopard Imaging AR023ZWDR USB
cameras, and a Novatel PwrPak7 dual-antenna GPS/IMU
TABLE I
TRACK TEST CASES SELECTED FROM SIMULATION
Hesitate Walk Start Minimum
Test Case Time (s) Distance (m) Delay (s) Distance (m)
F1 2.67 4.50 10.54 2.23
F2 2.93 4.24 11.53 1.91
M1 2.13 4.23 8.50 4.05
M2 1.96 5.02 8.77 4.78
M3 1.03 4.92 9.97 5.85
S1 2.85 6.88 7.64 5.45
S2 2.50 6.33 8.39 5.95
with RTK correction for ∼2 cm position accuracy. The tests
were performed using the open-source Apollo 3.56 self-
driving software [25] installed on an x86 Industrial PC with
an NVIDIA GTX-1080 GPU. Apollo’s perception processes
data from the LiDAR sensor using GPU-accelerated deep
neural networks to identify perceived obstacles.
Pedestrian Dummy and Associated Hardware: To implement
the pedestrian at GoMentum, we used a pulley-based 4Active
surfboard platform (SB) [26]. The battery powered system
drives a motor unit that pulls a drivable platform upon which
a “soft target”, i.e., an articulated pedestrian dummy [27], is
mounted. The dummy is designed to have a sensor signature
similar to real pedestrians. The SB can be programmed for
various types of motions, including the “hesitating pedes-
trian” trajectory used in our scenario.
Triggering Mechanisms: The trigger mechanism of the SB
initiates the movement of the pedestrian. For repeatability of
scenario testing, it is critical that the same trigger mechanism
is implemented both in simulation and in real world. We
originally attempted to configure the SB to trigger automat-
ically when a desired distance dstart between the AV and the
pedestrian is met. However, the SB manufacturer confirmed
that the SB does not support triggering based on distance
threshold, and we experimentally confirmed that manual
triggering based on an estimate of dstart is not accurate.
Therefore, as described in Sec. IV-B, we reparametrized our
scenario in terms of a threshold delay tstart measured as the
time elapsed from when the AV begins to move to when
the pedestrian begins to move. Although the SB hardware
does not support automatic triggering based on a time delay
either, we were able to implement more accurate triggering
by starting a countdown timer when the AV begins to move
and manually triggering the SB when the timer expired.
Setting up track tests was a tedious and time-consuming
effort: it took about 8 people half a day (4 hours) to simply
set up the scenario and calibrate the AV and equipment, and
then another half a day to go through around 25 test runs,
with each run taking 10-15 minutes.
B. Test Results
We executed the 7 test cases whose parameters are shown
in Table I at GoMentum. We performed several runs of each
test scenario, obtaining 23 runs in total; these are summarized
in Table II. The highlighted rows in the table are runs which
violated ϕsafe (i.e., have ρ < 0), while the white rows
satisfied ϕsafe. The colors of the highlighted rows indicate
the degree of unsafe behavior of the AV: red represents a
6This was the most recent Apollo version supported by our hardware.
TABLE II
TEST CASES SELECTED FROM SIMULATION, WITH CORRESPONDING
RUNS AT GOMENTUM. RUNS VIOLATING ϕSAFE ARE HIGHLIGHTED,
CLASSIFIED INTO COLLISIONS (RED), NEAR-COLLISIONS (ORANGE), OR
RUNS WHICH WERE UNSAFE BUT WITH A LARGER MARGIN (YELLOW).
Test Run Minimum TTC Minimum Distance ρ
F1 Simulation – 2.23 -0.27
F1 Run1 2.10 2.06 -0.44
F1 Run2 1.27 2.24 -0.26
F1 Run3 2.97 4.02 1.52
F1 Run4 5.05 6.19 3.69
F2 Simulation – 1.91 -0.59
F2 Run1 0.94 2.44 -0.06
F2 Run2 2.70 3.24 0.74
F2 Run3 1.20 1.58 -0.92
F2 Run4 1.05 2.24 -0.26
M1 Simulation – 4.05 1.55
M1 Run1 6.07 7.20 4.70
M1 Run2 7.16 7.89 5.39
M2 Simulation – 4.78 2.28
M2 Run1 3.24 3.40 0.90
M2 Run2 6.16 8.01 5.51
M2 Run3 9.10 14.38 11.88
M2 Run4 6.80 8.05 5.55
M2 Run5 7.69 8.48 5.98
M3 Simulation – 5.85 3.35
M3 Run1 0.75 1.94 -0.56
M3 Run2 6.00 6.36 3.86
M3 Run3 4.27 5.73 3.23
S1 Simulation – 5.45 2.95
S1 Run1 1.32 2.79 0.29
S1 Run2 9.72 8.50 6.00
S1 Run3 9.35 7.85 5.35
S2 Simulation – 5.95 3.45
S2 Run1 3.13 6.36 3.86
S2 Run2 8.66 9.00 6.50
collision (see Fig. 1), orange represents what we visually
classified as a near-collision, and yellow violates ϕsafe but
is not a near-collision. This coloring scheme brings out
distinctions that are not obvious from the Table II column
values. In particular, when ϕsafe is violated, the pedestrian
can be approaching the car from its side or from the front:
since the car is much longer than it is wide, a violation of
ϕsafe from a side approach is not always a (near-)collision,
resulting in the yellow rows in Table II.
Both in the simulator and at GoMentum, the minimum
distance is computed from the center of the AV to the pedes-
trian. Hence, the minimum distance is greater than zero even
though a collision occurred in F1 Run1 in Table II. The time-
to-collision (TTC) is approximated by dividing the distance
between the AV and the pedestrian by the AV’s relative speed
at every timestamp until either the pedestrian fully crossed
the lane or the AV intersected the pedestrian path before
it crossed the lane. Videos of all our tests are available
at http://bit.ly/GoM Videos, with a visualization of Apollo’s
perception and planning at http://bit.ly/DRV Videos. We will
discuss the causes of these failure cases in Sec. VI-C.
VI. DATA ANALYSIS
A. Effectiveness of our Methodology
We first consider whether formal simulation was effective
at designing track tests that revealed unsafe behaviors of
the AV. From Table II, we can see that this was in fact
the case: out of 8 runs of the two failure tests that were
identified in simulation, 5 violated ϕsafe in reality, including
one actual collision. For example, in test F1 Run1, the AV
initially braked, before repeatedly inching forward while the
pedestrian hesitated, ultimately colliding with it as shown in
Fig. 1. More noticeably, in 93.3% of all (marginally) safe
runs, AV satisfied ϕsafe in reality. As expected, a violation
case occurred in a marginally safe test, but none in safe tests.
While the number of runs is small due to limited time and
resources, they clearly demonstrate how simulation can be
efficiently used to identify real-world failures.
On the other hand, Table II also shows that the results
of a test on the track can deviate significantly from results
in simulation. For example, our first run of test case M3,
which was safe in simulation, yielded a very near miss, with
a minimum distance of 1.94 m (vs. 5.85 m in simulation).
The track test results also have significant variability, with
test case M2 for example having minimum distances ranging
widely from 3–14 m in different runs. In the next section,
we look at these discrepancies in more detail.
B. The Gap Between Simulation and Reality
There are a variety of possible sources of such discrepan-
cies between simulation and track runs, including:
• mismatch in the initial conditions of the test (e.g. the AV
starting at a different location due to GPS error);
• mismatch in the dynamics of the AV or pedestrian
(e.g. incompletely-modeled physics in the simulator or
imprecision in the mechanism triggering the SB);
• mismatch in the AV’s sensory input (e.g. reduced LiDAR
point cloud density in simulation, or synthetic image
rendering);
• timing differences due to Apollo running on different
hardware in the AV and our simulation setup.
Some of these sources of variation could be eliminated
with improvements to the experimental setup which were
not possible here given resource and time constraints, e.g.,
hardware that permits automating triggering based on tstart
or dstart can reduce error in implementing ~pi. However, other
potential sources of error are hard to quantify: even small
details of rendering, for example, could potentially change
the behavior of the perception components in Apollo. To
measure the sim-to-real gap resulting from such sources,
we used traces recorded from several tests to extract imple-
mented ~pi on the track. We then ran a new simulation using
these ~pi, which would ideally reproduce the same trace as
the track test; in fact, we ran 5 identical simulations per test
to assess the nondeterminism of the hardware and AV stack.
The resulting trajectories for 2 test cases are shown in
Fig. 6. The simulated and real trajectories show considerable
overlap but also differ: for example, although we intended
the simulated AV to start from the same position as the real
one, Apollo refused to drive from that position and we had to
adjust it slightly. More interestingly, the simulated AV turns
more sharply than the real one, possibly due to imprecise
modeling in the simulator of the effects of driving slightly
uphill. Finally, the 5 simulations are tightly-clustered but not
Fig. 6. Trajectories from a track test and 5 resimulations respectively
for the AV (green/blue) and the pedestrian (orange/yellow). Color darkness
indicates time. Scenarios: S1 Run 2 (left), F1 Run 1 (right).
TABLE III
AVG. DISTANCES BETWEEN TRACK/RESIMULATED AV TRAJECTORIES.
MEASURES USE THE L2 NORM WITH UNITS OF METERS AND SECONDS.
Track Test Real-to-Sim Sim-to-Sim
Run Skorokhod DTW Skorokhod DTW
S1 Run2 5.85 1.09 1.11 0.17
S3 Run3 5.05 0.91 2.83 0.24
F1 Run1 10.88 1.39 3.67 0.37
F1 Run3 5.08 0.90 3.29 0.26
identical, showing that even a single test case can yield a
range of different simulated traces.
To quantify these discrepancies, taking into account not
only the shape of the trajectories but also their evolution over
time, we used the Skorokhod metric, which measures the
worst-case deviation of two timed traces and can be used to
prove conformance: a bound on how far simulated traces can
be from real ones in the Skorokhod metric allows transferring
temporal logic guarantees from simulation to reality [8].
To illustrate the metric, two otherwise-identical trajectories
which differ at one point by 1 m or are globally shifted by
1 s would have a Skorokhod distance of 1. We also use the
(normalized) Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance [7]
to give a measure of similarity averaged over the entire
trajectory rather than at the worst point. For example, two
trajectories differing by 1 m at a single point (out of many)
would have a normalized DTW distance of approximately 0,
vs. 1 for trajectories differing everywhere by 1 m.
Table III shows these measures for the 4 track tests where
we successfully logged accurate GPS trajectories. The “Real-
to-Sim” column shows the average distance between the real
trajectory and the 5 corresponding simulations, while the
“Sim-to-Sim” column shows the average distance among the
5 simulations. The Skorokhod distance between the real and
simulated trajectories is large, indicating deviations on the
order of 5–11 meters or seconds. This suggests that while
our simulation environment was faithful enough to reality to
produce qualitatively similar runs (as we saw in Sec. VI-A),
it is not yet accurate enough to enable deriving guarantees
on the real system purely through simulation.
Although the simulations are much closer to each other
than to the original track test, they still show substantial
variation (e.g., the resimulations of F1 Run 1 have large
TABLE IV
HYPOTHESIZED CAUSES OF THE OBSERVED UNSAFE BEHAVIOR.
Test Case Perception Fail. Prediction Fail. Planning Fail.
F1 Run1 X – –
F1 Run2 – – X
F2 Run1 – X –
F2 Run3 – – X
F2 Run4 – – X
M3 Run1 – – X
Skorokhod distance). As the LGSVL Simulator is determin-
istic, this shows that either the asynchronous interface to
Apollo or nondeterminism within Apollo itself can produce
significantly different behavior on identical test cases. Our
methodology could likely be improved by taking this nonde-
terminism into account: tests with lower variance are more
likely to be reproducible on the track, while tests with high
variance may indicate undesirable sensitivity of the AV stack.
C. Why Did the Autonomous Vehicle Fail?
Finally, by replaying our track data in Dreamview, a tool to
visualize Apollo’s perception, prediction, and planning, we
identified several types of failures that led to unsafe behavior,
summarized in Table IV. The simplest type was a perception
failure, where Apollo failed to detect the pedestrian for at
least 1 s: this was responsible for the crash in Fig. 1. The
most common failure was unsafe planning, where Apollo
alternated between yielding and overtaking the pedestrian.
Most interestingly, we also observed a case of prediction
failure, where the AV incorrectly predicted that the pedestrian
would walk around the AV and that moving forward was,
therefore, safe. While our goal is not to find fault with
Apollo (recall also that we could only run version 3.5 from
January 2019 on our hardware), our results illustrate how our
methodology can help to find and debug failure cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented a formal methods approach to scenario-
based test generation for autonomous vehicles in simulation,
and to the selection and execution of road tests, leveraging
the SCENIC language and the VERIFAI toolkit. We demon-
strated that a formal simulation approach can be effective at
identifying relevant tests for track testing with a real AV. We
also compared time-series data recorded in simulation and
on the track, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Our data
and analysis scripts can be found online [28].
There are several directions for future work, includ-
ing evaluating our methodology on more complex higher-
dimensional scenarios, performing more detailed automated
analysis of failures in perception, planning, or prediction,
bridging the sim-to-real gap with further improvements to
simulation technology, and developing more sophisticated
track test equipment that can better match simulation.
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